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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
Walter Ka¨lin*
Are human rights in general, and the prohibition of torture in
particular, universal, i.e. applicable to all human beings regardless
of nationality, race, gender, or origin?  Since the 1776 Virginia Bill
of Rights proclaimed, “[T]hat all men are by nature equally free
and independent, and have certain inherent rights . . . ”1 the an-
swer is yes, a yes confirmed by the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.2  While it is recognized that individuals cannot be
excluded from the protection of their human rights for reasons of
who they are, some States, among them the United States, assert
that exceptions from the universal applicability of human rights
exist in certain situations and locations.  For example, the United
States maintains that the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights “does not apply extraterritorially.”3  In regards to the
Convention Against Torture (“the Convention”), the United States
on the one hand stresses that “U.S. officials from all government
agencies are prohibited from engaging in torture, at all times, and
in all places.”4
On the other hand, it underlines that the Convention Against
Torture does not apply in the context of U.S. military actions on
foreign soil because “U.S. detention operations in Guantanamo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq are part of ongoing armed conflicts and, ac-
cordingly, are governed by the law of armed conflict, which is the
lex specialis applicable to those particular operations.”5  In other
words, the United States accepts that it is bound by the torture
prohibitions provided for by international humanitarian law, but
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1 Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), art. 1, http://www.gunstonhall.org/
documents/vdr.html (last visited 10/25/08).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
3 United States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights
Committee (October 10, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/100845.pdf.
4 The United States’ Response to the Questions Asked by the Committee Against
Torture, May 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68562.htm.
5 Id.
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rejects any obligation to respect the Convention Against Torture in
the context of overseas military operations.
It is true that international humanitarian law contains unam-
biguous prohibitions of torturing and ill-treating the civilian popu-
lation and everyone who has laid down his or her arms (persons hors
de combat),6 and international criminal law makes such acts punish-
able as a war crime.7  However, the distinction made by the United
States is not of an academic nature but has the practical conse-
quence of not being subjected to the reporting duties under Arti-
cle 19 of the Convention or under any other international
monitoring mechanism.  Therefore, it is relevant whether or not
the Convention Against Torture binds a State party when acting
outside its own territory.
THE POSITION OF THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
The Committee against Torture (“CAT”) does not agree with
the positions espoused by the United States. In the 2006 Conclu-
sions and Recommendations issued at the end of its consideration
of the second report of the U.S. under Article 19 of the Conven-
tion, the Committee called on the U.S. to “recognize and ensure
that the Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or
armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction.”8  It further-
more reiterated its “view that this includes all areas under the de
facto effective control of the State party, by whichever military or
civil authorities such control is exercised” and considered “the
State party’s view that those provisions are geographically limited
to its own de jure territory to be regrettable.”9  It therefore recom-
mended that the United States recognize that the provisions of the
Convention expressed are applicable to any “territory under the
6 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I) art. 75(2)(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(a), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, arts. 8(2)(a)(ii), 8(2)(c)(i) (declaring torture a crime
against humanity when it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population); see also id., art. 7(1)(f).
8 Committee Against Torture, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
Against Torture, United States of America, ¶ 14, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, (July 25, 2006),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/cats36.htm.
9 Id. ¶ 15.
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State party’s jurisdiction” and can be “fully enjoyed, by all persons
under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type,
wherever located in the world.”10  These statements reflect the obli-
gation of States parties enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention to
“take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”11
In General Comment No. 2, the Committee against Torture
now reiterates “that the concept of ‘any territory under its jurisdic-
tion,’ linked as it is with the concept of non-derogability, includes
any territory or facilities and must be applied to protect any per-
son, citizen or non-citizen, without discrimination subject to the de
jure or de facto control of a State party.”12
This is a bold and welcome reaffirmation of the universality of
the prohibition of torture, which would be seriously undermined if
relevant legal instruments could be circumvented by simply “ex-
porting” such ill-treatment to a territory outside one’s own bounda-
ries.  The notion of “any territory under its jurisdiction” as well as
the statement in General Comment No. 2 raise, however, certain
questions, among them the following: 1) Is this notion to a large
degree irrelevant in the present context, as the Convention Against
Torture does not find any application in situations of armed con-
flict anyway? 2) If no, what is the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’? and 3)
What kind of relationship must exist between the exercise of juris-
diction and a given territory to make the Convention applicable?
APPLICABILITY IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT
Extraterritorial applicability of the Convention Against Tor-
ture is particularly relevant in times of armed conflict.  However,
the issue becomes relevant only if, in fact, the Convention applies
in such situations, too.
The U.S. argument that international humanitarian law as lex
specialis makes the Convention Against Torture inapplicable at
times and locations of armed conflict is clearly refuted by Article
2(2) of the Convention.  By stating that “[n]o exceptional circum-
stances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, . . .
10 Id.
11 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, art. 2, ¶ 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Convention].
12 U.N. Office of the High Comm’n on Human Rights [OHCHR], Comm. Against
Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 7, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment No. 2].
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may be invoked as a justification of torture,”13 this provision pre-
supposes that the obligation to refrain from and prevent torture as
embodied in paragraph 1 of the same article has to be respected in
situations of armed conflict, too.  This is in line with, for example,
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
explicitly declaring that the prohibition of torture also applies
“[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the na-
tion,”14 a condition that is clearly fulfilled in a situation of armed
conflict, and similar language in regional conventions.15  General
Comment No. 2 of the Committee Against Torture, therefore, cor-
rectly stresses that the prohibition of torture must also be fully
respected during “a state of war or threat thereof, internal political
instability or any other public emergency.  This includes any threat
of terrorist acts or violent crime as well as armed conflict, interna-
tional or non-international.”16
More generally, the International Court of Justice, in its 2004
advisory opinion entitled “Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” considered “that
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease
in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for
derogation[,]”17 meaning that some guarantees may simultane-
ously be a matter of human rights and international humanitarian
law.  This is certainly the case for torture, which is prohibited si-
multaneously by international human rights, humanitarian, and
criminal law, as indicated above.  Thus, General Comment No. 2 is
sound in insisting on the applicability of the Convention also in
times of armed conflict.
EXERCISING JURISDICTION
The second issue to consider is the notion of jurisdiction.  The
U.N. Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) has defined this notion
13 Convention, supra note 11, art. 2 ¶ 2.
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
art. 4 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/6316, (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR].
15 See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15, Sept. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].  The convention
provides for the possibility of derogation “[i]n time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation,” id ¶1, but excludes torture from the list of dero-
gable guarantees, id. ¶ 2.
16 General Comment No. 2, supra note 12, ¶ 5.
17 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9), available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf.
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as being “the power or effective control” over an individual exer-
cised by a State within or outside its own territory, regardless of
whether it is carried out de jure or just de facto, i.e. “regardless of
the circumstances in which such power or effective control was ob-
tained.”18  Such power or effective control must, however, be direct
and immediate.  The European Court on Human Rights held in
the Bancovic case, concerning an air to ground missile attack on a
television studio in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, that
jurisdiction understood in this way does not exist in the case of
military air strikes on a hostile country in which the State con-
cerned exercises neither control over the population nor any pub-
lic powers.19
Whether a specific action by a State having an impact on an
individual may be qualified as jurisdiction is, as the Bancovic case
indicates, often difficult to determine.  Such difficulties do not
arise in the context of torture.  Torture can only be carried out if
the victim is in the hands and under the direct and effective con-
trol of the torturer; furthermore, Article 1 of the Convention re-
quires that it be inflicted on a person “by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other per-
son acting in an official capacity.”20  These two elements of control
over the victim and attributability to the State make torture as de-
fined by the Convention Against Torture necessarily and automati-
cally an exercise of jurisdiction.  Taking into account the severity of
this human rights violation and the extremely high degree of con-
trol over the victim, one could even describe torture as the ulti-
mate, albeit deeply illegitimate and abusive, exercise of State
power.
THE LINKAGE BETWEEN TERRITORY AND JURISDICTION
The third and most complex issue in the context of the Con-
vention Against Torture is the linkage between territory and juris-
diction required in order for the Convention to become applicable
outside a State party’s territory.  The relationship between the con-
cepts of jurisdiction and territory is complex.  The notion of nation
state and the related concept of territorial sovereignty imply, on
18 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, [80] Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
CCPR.C.21.Rev.1.Add.13.En?Opendocument [hereinafter Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 31].
19 Bankovic v. U.K., 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 75 (2001).
20 Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
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the one hand, the presumption that States exercise their jurisdic-
tion over their own territory.  As Max Huber in his 1928 award in
the Island of Palmas case highlighted, “[s]overeignty in the relation
between States signifies independence.  Independence in regard to
a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclu-
sion of any other State, the functions of a State.”21  On the other
hand however, experience shows that that, for example, in the con-
text of a belligerent occupation, States may disregard this right and
exercise some of their functions on the territory of another State.
This is why human rights conventions often contain provisions ex-
plicitly addressing this issue.  This is done in a variety of ways.
Some human rights treaties such as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Article 2) or the European Convention on
Human Rights (Article 1) simply require States parties to secure
guarantees to individuals “within their jurisdiction” with no men-
tion of their territory.22  This provides for their extraterritorial ap-
plication, as a State can also clearly exercise de facto jurisdiction
outside its own national territory.
This has been explicitly recognized by the European Court of
Human Rights, which recognized that “the concept of ‘jurisdiction’
under Article 1 of the [European Convention on Human Rights] is
not restricted to the national territory of the Contracting States.
Accordingly, the responsibility of Contracting States can be in-
volved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce ef-
fects outside their own [territory].”23  The Court further recalled,
in conformity with the relevant principles of international law gov-
erning State responsibility, that the responsibility of a Contracting
Party could also arise when as a consequence of military action—
whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of an
area outside its national territory.  The obligation to secure, in
such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention,
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised di-
rectly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local
administration.24
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights seems to use a
much narrower approach by imposing the obligation on States to
ensure Covenant rights “to all individuals within its territory and
21 Island of Palmas (Neth. V. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb 1928).
22 See CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, G.A. RES. 44/25, ART. 2 ¶ 1, U.N.
DOC. A/44/49 (NOV. 20, 1989), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
k2crc.htm; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art 1.
23 Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, 530 (1996).
24 Id.
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subject to its jurisdiction.”25  The wording is ambiguous inasmuch
as the “and” linking the elements of the State’s own territory and
that of jurisdiction over the person concerned can be construed as
a cumulative requirement, meaning those parts of the national ter-
ritory that are subject to the jurisdiction of the State concerned; or
as an “and/or” alternative referring to individuals within a State’s
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, as well as individuals who
are not within the territory, but are nonetheless subject to the juris-
diction of the State concerned because they are under its power
and effective control.
The HRC has since long espoused the second interpretation.
Two communications submitted to the HRC in 1977 addressed
Uruguay’s responsibility for the abduction and torture of oppo-
nents of the regime who had been tracked down and arrested in
neighbouring countries by its intelligence services.  The HRC held
that the Covenant had extraterritorial scope of application, argu-
ing that a literal interpretation of Article 2 would lead to the ab-
surd conclusion that States parties could perpetrate with impunity
abroad human rights violations that were prohibited within their
own frontiers.26
As one of the members of the HRC highlighted, the wording
of Article 2 was not intended to apply to such cases but to special
circumstances in which the State was faced with objective obstacles
such as foreign occupation in exercising its jurisdiction in part of
the national territory.27  In its Advisory Opinion on the so-called
wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court
of Justice endorsed that interpretation.  It noted that Article 2 “can
be interpreted as covering only individuals who are both present
within a State’s territory and subject to that State’s jurisdiction.  It
can also be construed as covering both individuals present within a
State’s territory and those outside that territory, but subject to that
State’s jurisdiction.”28
The Court, after having analyzed the drafting history and the
practice of the HRC, concluded that the Covenant is applicable to
25 ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 2 ¶ 1.
26 See Delia Saldias de Lo´pez (on behalf of her husband Sergio Rube´n Lo´pez Bur-
gos) v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979 (adopted on July 29, 1981) (Report of
the Human Rights Committee U.N. GAOR Doc. A/36/40) (68 I.L.R. 29); Lilian Ce-
liberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979 (adopted on July 29,
1981) (Report of the Human Rights Committee U.N. GAOR Doc.A/36/40) (68 I.L.R.
29).
27 Id.
28 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 109 (July 9).
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all acts undertaken by a State when exercising jurisdiction outside
its territory, because the drafters of the treaty had certainly not in-
tended the wording of Article 2 to allow States to escape from their
obligations when they exercised jurisdiction abroad.29
Similarly, General Comment No. 31 of the HRC emphasizes
that the Covenant protects anyone within the power or effective
control of a State party; this principle also applies where military
forces exercise such control abroad, for example, in the context of
international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations.30  As
the HRC has made clear, the general rules of State responsibility
determine in such circumstances the acts for which a State whose
forces are operating in foreign territory is to be held accountable.31
Regarding the Convention Against Torture, it is noteworthy
that Article 2(1) uses neither the language of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, nor that of the Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.  Rather, it provides that it links a State party’s obliga-
tion to “acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”32
While this formula puts the emphasis on jurisdiction over a terri-
tory, not a person, it is clear that State control over the victim of
torture is the first condition that must be met to make the Conven-
tion binding upon a State in a particular case.  However, it seems to
add, as a second condition, the requirement that jurisdiction over
a person is combined with jurisdiction over a territory.  In other
words: The Convention Against Torture is binding upon a State
party if it exercises jurisdiction over a person in a territory under its
jurisdiction.
In doing so, the Convention Against Torture, arguably, uses a
narrower approach than the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
as interpreted by the HRC and the International Court of Justice,
raising the question as to what is necessary to have de jure or de
facto jurisdiction over a territory.  The following situation can be
29 Id. ¶¶ 110, 111. The Court confirmed at the same time that the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on
the Right of the Child (CRC) also have extraterritorial scope, stressing, however, that
the rights guaranteed by the (ICESCR), by their nature, are essentially territorial, so
that a State is bound by obligations outside its territory only if its exercises effective
jurisdiction as in the case of occupation. Id. ¶ 112 (discussing the ICESCR, which has
no general scope of application clause); id. ¶ 113 (discussing CRC art. 2, which men-
tions only the jurisdiction aspect).
30 See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, supra note 18, ¶ 10.
31 See generally Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee of Israel, ¶ 11, CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocument.
32 Convention, supra note 11, art. 2 ¶ 1.
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distinguished: As jurisdiction is defined as power and effective con-
trol, it exists on a State’s own territory unless part of it is held by
insurgents or a foreign occupying force.  If a foreign State occupies
another State’s territory during an international armed conflict, or
if it has exclusive control over part of another State by virtue of a
lease of a similar arrangement, then that territory is certainly
under the jurisdiction of the foreign State.
Arguably, a territory under the jurisdiction of a foreign coun-
try can also comprise of a piece of land that is used as a military
base or detention facility if such installation is not only of a very
passing nature and the State running it has exclusive control over
it.  On the other hand, a short commando operation in another
country leading to the apprehension and subsequent torturing of
an individual certainly does not lead to jurisdiction over that terri-
tory. Unlike in the case of other human rights conventions, the
Convention Against Torture does not apply here and victims have
to seek redress under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or
an applicable regional convention.
CONCLUSION
The statement contained in paragraph 7 of General Comment
No. 2 to the effect “that the concept of ‘any territory under its juris-
diction’ . . . includes any territory or facilities and must be applied
to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen, without discrimina-
tion subject to the de jure or de facto control of a State party,”33
while not explicitly highlighting all complexities of the issue, is cor-
rect provided that the State concerned has a solid and not just pass-
ing control over the location where the torture takes place.  This
condition is fulfilled not only when a State is torturing, instigating
torture, or acquiescing to it on its own territory, but also on foreign
territories it occupies.  The condition is also fulfilled outside situa-
tions of occupation, in detention facilities or military bases that are
not just of a passing nature and are run under the exclusive control
of the State concerned.
33 General Comment No. 2, supra note 12, ¶ 7.

